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Abstract Automated systems designed for screening
contraband items from the X-ray imagery are still
facing difficulties with high clutter, concealment, and
extreme occlusion. In this paper, we addressed this
challenge using a novel multi-scale contour instance
segmentation framework that effectively identifies
the cluttered contraband data within the baggage
X-ray scans. Unlike standard models that employ
region-based or keypoint-based techniques to generate
multiple boxes around objects, we propose to derive
proposals according to the hierarchy of the regions
defined by the contours. The proposed framework is
rigorously validated on three public datasets, dubbed
GDXray, SIXray, and OPIXray, where it outperforms
the state-of-the-art methods by achieving the mean
average precision score of 0.9779, 0.9614, and 0.8396,
respectively. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first contour instance segmentation
framework that leverages multi-scale information to
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recognize cluttered and concealed contraband data
from the colored and grayscale security X-ray imagery.
Keywords Aviation Security · Structure Tensors ·
Instance Segmentation · Baggage X-ray Scans.

1 Introduction
X-ray imagery is a widely used modality for nondestructive testing [1], especially for screening illegal
and smuggled items at airports, cargoes, and malls.
Manual baggage inspection is a tiring task and susceptible to errors caused due to exhausting work
routines and less experienced personnel. Initial systems
proposed to address these problems employed conventional machine learning [2]. Driven by hand-engineered
features, these methods are only applicable to limited
data and confined environmental settings [3]. Recently,
attention has turned to deep learning methods, which
gave a neat boost in accuracy and generalization capacity towards screening prohibited baggage items [4, 5].
However, deep learning methods are also prone to clutter, and occlusion [6]. This limitation emanates from
the proposal generation strategies which have been
designed for the color images [7]. Unlike RGB scans,
X-ray imagery lack texture and exhibit low-intensity
variations between cluttered objects. This intrinsic
difference makes the region-based or anchor-based
proposal generation methods such as Mask R-CNN [8],
Faster R-CNN [9], RetinaNet [10], and YOLO [11] less
robust for detecting the cluttered contraband data [6].
Moreover, the problem is further accentuated by the
class imbalance nature of the contraband items in
the real-world [7]. Despite the considerate strategies
proposed to alleviate the occlusion and the imbalance
nature [12, 13], recognizing threatening objects in
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highly cluttered and concealed scenarios is still an
open problem [14].

conventional approaches both in terms of performance,
and efficiency [6]. In this section, we discuss some of
the major baggage threat detection works. We refer
the readers to [14, 18] for an exhaustive survey.

1.1 Contributions
In this paper, we propose a novel multi-scale contour
instance segmentation framework for identifying suspicious items using X-ray scans. Unlike standard models
that employ region-based or keypoint-based techniques
to generate multiple boxes around objects [5, 6, 15], we
propose to derive proposals according to the hierarchy
of the regions defined by the contours. The insight driving this approach is that contours are the most reliable
cue in the X-ray scans due to the lack of surface texture.
For example, the occluded items exhibit different transitional patterns based upon their orientation, contrast,
and intensity. We try to amplify and exploit this information through the multi-scale scan decomposition,
which boosts the proposed framework’s capacity for detecting the underlying contraband data in the presence
of clutter. Furthermore, we are also motivated by the
fact that organic material’s suspicious items show only
their outlines in the X-ray scans [42]. To summarize,
the main features of this paper are:
– Detection of overlapping suspicious items by analyzing their predominant orientations across multiple
scales within the candidate scan. Unlike [42–44], we
propose a novel tensor pooling strategy to decompose the scan across various scales and fuses them
via a single multi-scale tensor. This scheme results in
more salient contour maps (see Figure 1), boosting
our framework’s capacity for handling dulled, concealed, and overlapping items.
– A thorough validation on three publicly available
large-scale baggage X-ray datasets, including the
OPIXray [12], which is the only dataset allowing a
quantitative measure of the level of occlusion.
– Unlike state-of-the-art methods such as CST [42],
TST [43], and DTS [44], the performance of the proposed framework to detect occluded items has been
quantitatively evaluated on OPIXray [12] dataset.
Please see Table 4 for more details.

2 Related Work
Many researchers have developed computer-aided
screening systems to identify potential baggage
threats [23]. While a majority of these frameworks
are based on conventional machine learning [16], the
recent works also employ supervised [5], and unsupervised [17] deep learning, and these methods outperform

2.1 Traditional Methods
The early baggage screening systems were driven via
classification [3], segmentation [19] and detection [20]
approaches to identify potential threats and smuggled
items. Here, the work of Bastan et al. [2] is appreciable,
which identifies the suspicious and illegal items within
the multi-view X-ray imagery through fused SIFT and
SPIN driven SVM model. Similarly, SURF [19], and
FAST-SURF [22] have also been used with the Bag of
Words [21] to identify threatening items from the security X-ray imagery. Moreover, approaches like adapted
implicit shape model [24] and adaptive sparse representation [23] were also commendable for screening suspicious objects from the X-ray scans.

2.2 Deep Learning Frameworks
The deep learning-based baggage screening frameworks
have been broadly categorized into supervised and unsupervised learning schemes.
2.2.1 Supervised Methods
The initial deep learning approaches involved scanlevel classification to identify the suspicious baggage
content [5]. However, with the recent advancements in
object detection, researchers also employed sophisticated detectors like RetinaNet [10], YOLO [31,32], and
Faster R-CNN [9] to not only recognize the contraband
items from the baggage X-ray scans but also to localize
them via bounding boxes [6]. Moreover, researchers
also proposed semantic segmentation [29] and instance
segmentation [43] models to recognize threatening and
smuggled items from the grayscale and colored X-ray
imagery. Apart from this, Xiao et al. [34] presented an
efficient implementation of Faster R-CNN [9] to detect
suspicious data from the TeraHertz imagery. Dhiraj
et al. [38] used Faster R-CNN [9], YOLOv2 [32], and
Tiny YOLO [32] to screen baggage threats contained
within the scans of a publicly available GDXray
dataset [39]. Gaus et al. [7] utilized RetinaNet [10],
Faster R-CNN [9], Mask R-CNN [8] (driven through
ResNets [35], VGG-16 [37], and SqueezeNet [36])
to detect prohibited baggage items. In another approach [15], they analyzed the transferability of these
models on a similarly styled X-ray imagery contained
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within their local dataset as well as the SIXray10
subset of the publicly available SIXray dataset [13].
Similarly, Akçay et al. [6] compared Faster R-CNN [9],
YOLOv2 [32], R-FCN [41], and sliding-window CNN
with the AlexNet [40] driven SVM model to recognize
occluded contraband items from the X-ray imagery.
Miao et al. [13] explored the imbalanced nature of
the contraband items in the real-world by developing a class-balanced hierarchical refinement (CHR)
framework. Furthermore, they extensively tested their
framework (backboned through different classification
models) on their publicly released SIXray [13] dataset.
Wei et al. [12] presented a plug-and-play module
dubbed De-occlusion Attention Module (DOAM) that
can be coupled with any object detector to enhance
its capacity towards screening occluded contraband
items. DOAM was validated on the publicly available
OPIXray [12] dataset, which is the first of its kind
in providing quantitative assessments of baggage
screening frameworks under low, partial, and full
occlusion [12]. Apart from this, Hassan et al. [42] also
addressed the imbalanced nature of the contraband
data by developing the cascaded structure tensors
(CST) based baggage threat detector. CST [42] generates a balanced set of contour-based proposals, which
are then utilized in training the backbone model to
screen the normal and abnormal baggage items within
the candidate scan [42]. Similarly, to overcome the need
to train the threat detection systems on large-scale
and well-annotated data, Hassan et al. [44] introduced
meta-transfer learning-based dual tensor-shot (DTS)
detector. DTS [44] analyzes the scan’s saliency to
produce low and high-density contour maps from
which the suspicious contraband items are identified
effectively with few-shot training [44]. In another
approach, Hassan et al. [43] developed an instance
segmentation-based threat detection framework that
filters the contours of the suspicious items from
the regular content via trainable structure tensors
(TST) [43] to identify them accurately within the
security X-ray imagery.

3

Fig. 1: (A) An exemplar X-ray scan from the GDXray
dataset [39], (B) contour map obtained through the
modified structure tensors in [42] and [43], (C) contour
map obtained through proposed tensor pooling strategy.

ploys skip-connections in an encoder-decoder topology
that not only gives better latent representations for
detecting baggage threats but also reduces the overall
computational complexity of GANomaly [45].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
3 presents the proposed framework. Section 4 describes
the experimental setup. Section 5 discusses the results
obtained with three public baggage X-ray datasets. Section 6 concludes the paper and enlists future directions.

3 Proposed Approach
The block diagram of the proposed framework is depicted in Figure 2. The input scan is fed to the tensor pooling module (block A) to generate a multi-scale
tensor representation, revealing the baggage content’s
transitional patterns at multiple predominant orientations and across various scales. Afterward, the multiscale tensor is passed to the encoder-decoder backbone
(block B), implementing the newly proposed contour
maps-based instance segmentation. This block extracts
the contours of the prohibited data while eliminating
the irrelevant scan content. In the third stage (block
C), each extracted contour, reflecting the contraband
item instance, is utilized in generating the respective
mask and the bounding box for localization. In the subsequent sections, we present a detailed description of
each module within the proposed framework.

2.2.2 Unsupervised Methods
While most baggage screening frameworks involved supervised learning, researchers have also explored adversarial learning to screen contraband data as anomalies.
Akçay et al. [45], among others, laid the foundation
of unsupervised baggage threat detection by proposing GANomaly [45], an encoder-decoder-encoder network trained in an adversarial manner to recognize prohibited items within baggage X-ray scans. In another
work, they proposed Skip-GANomaly [17] which em-

3.1 Tensor Pooling Module
The tensor pooling module decomposes the input scan
into n levels of a pyramid. From each level of the pyramid, the baggage content’s transitional patterns are
generated by analyzing their distribution of orientations within the associated image gradients. In the proposed tensor pooling scheme, we highlight the transitional patterns in N image gradients (corresponding to
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Fig. 2: Block diagram of the proposed framework. The input scan is passed to the tensor pooling module to extract
the tensor representations encoding the baggage items’ contours at different orientations. These representations
are fused into a single multi-scale tensor and passed afterward to an asymmetric encoder-decoder backbone that
segments and recognizes the contraband item’s contours while suppressing the rest of the baggage content. For
each detected contour, the corresponding bounding box and mask is generated to localize the detected contraband
items. The abbreviations are CV: Convolution, BN: Batch Normalization, SPB: Shape Preserving Block, IB:
Identity Block, MP: Max Pooling, AP: Average Pooling, ZP: Zero Padding, SM: Softmax.
N directions) by computing the following N × N blockstructured symmetric matrix [42, 43]:

φ ∗ (∇1 .∇0 ) · · ·

φ ∗ (∇1 .∇1 ) · · ·


..
..

.
.
φ ∗ (∇0 .∇N −1 ) φ ∗ (∇1 .∇N −1 ) · · ·


φ ∗ (∇0 .∇0 )
φ ∗ (∇0 .∇1 )
..
.

the extraction of the objects having lower transitions
with the background [42, 43]. To address this limitation, we propose a multi-scale tensor fusing the X-ray
 scan transitions from coarsest to finest levels so that
φ ∗ (∇N −1 .∇0 )
each item, even having a low-intensity difference with
φ ∗ (∇N −1 .∇1 ) 
 the background, can be adequately highlighted. For ex , ample, see the boundaries of: the razor in a multi-scale
..

.
tensor representation in Figure 1 (C), the straight knife
N −1
N −1
φ ∗ (∇
.∇
)
in Figure 3 (G), the two knives and a gun in Figure 3
(1)
(H), and the two guns and a knife in Figure 3 (I).

Each tensor (φ ∗ (∇k .∇m )) in the above block-matrix is
an outer product of two image gradients and a smoothing filter φ. Moreover, the orientation (θ), of the image
gradient ∇j , is computed through: θ = 2πj
N , where j
ranges from 0 to N − 1. Since the block-structured matrix in Eq. 1 is symmetric, we obtain N (N2−1) unique
tensors. From this group, we derive the coherent tensor, reflecting the baggage items’ predominant orientations. The coherent tensor is a single tensor representation generated by adding the most useful tensors out of
the N (N2+1) unique tensor set. Here, it should be noted
that these useful tensors are selected by ranking all the
N (N +1)
unique tensors according to their norm.
2
Moreover, the coherent tensor also reveals the variations in the intensity of the cluttered baggage items,
aiding in generating individual contours for each item.
However, this scheme analyzes only the intensity variations of the baggage items at a single scale, limiting

As mentioned earlier, the multi-scale tensors are computed through pyramid pooling (up to nth level). At any
lth level, (such that 2 ≤ l ≤ n), we multiply, pixel-wise,
the decomposed image with the transitions obtained
at the previous (l − 1) levels. In so doing, we ensure
that the edges of the contraband items (procured earlier) are retained across each scale. The full procedure
of the proposed tensor pooling module is depicted in
Algorithm 1 and also shown in Figure 2.

The multi-scale tensor is then passed to the proposed
encoder-decoder model to extract the contours of the
individual suspicious items. A detailed discussion about
contour instance segmentation is presented in the subsequent section.

Tensor Pooling Driven Instance Segmentation Framework for Baggage Threat Recognition
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Algorithm 1: Tensor Pooling Module
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Input: X-ray scan (I), Scaling Factor (n), Number
of Orientations (N )
Output: Multi-scale Tensor (Mt )
[r, c] = size(I)
Initialize Mt (of size r × c) with zeros
Set η = 2 // pyramid pooling factor
for i = 0 to n − 1 do
if i is 0 then
= = ComputeTensors(I, N ) // =: Tensors
=c = GetCoherentTensor(=)
Mt = Mt + =c
else
[s, t] = size(I)
if (min(s, t) % η) 6= 0 or min(s, t) < η then
break
end
I = Pool(I, η)
=c = Pool(=c , η)
I = I × =c
= = ComputeTensors(I, N )
=c = GetCoherentTensor(=)
Mt = Mt + Unpool(=c , η i )
end
end

Fig. 4: Contour instance segmentation from multi-scale
tensors. The first column shows the original scans, the
second column shows the multi-scale tensor representations, the third column shows the ground truths, and
the fourth column shows the extracted contours of the
contraband items.

Fig. 3: Difference between conventional structure tensors (used in [42, 43]), and proposed multi-scale tensor approach. First row shows the original scans from
OPIXray [12], GDXray [39], and SIXray [13] dataset.
The second row shows the output for the conventional
structure tensors [42, 43]. The third row shows the output for the proposed tensor pooling module.

instances to which we add the class background which
include background and irrelevant pixels (i.e., pixels
belonging to a non-suspicious baggage content).
Furthermore, to differentiate between the contours of
the normal and suspicious items, the custom shapepreserving (SPB) and identity blocks (IB) have been
added within the encoder topology. The SPB, as depicted in Figures 2 and 5 (A), integrates the multi-scale
tensor map (after scaling) in the feature map extraction
to enforce further the attention on prohibited items’
outlines. The IB (Figure 5-A), inspired by ResNet architecture [35], acts as a residual block to emphasize
the feature maps of the previous layer.
Apart from this, the whole network encompasses one
input, one zero-padding, 22 convolution, 20 batch normalization, 12 activation, four pooling, two multiply,
six addition, three lambda (that implements the custom functions), and one reshape layer. Moreover, we
use skip-connections (via addition) within the encoderdecoder to refine the extracted items’ boundaries. The
number of parameters within the network is 1,308,160,
from which around 6,912 parameters are non-trainable.
The detailed summary of the proposed model (including the architectural details of the SPB and IB blocks)
is available in the source code repository1 .

3.2 Contour Instance Segmentation

3.3 Bounding Box and Mask Generation

The contour instance segmentation is performed
through the proposed asymmetric encoder-decoder
network, which assigns the pixels in the multi-scale
tensors to one of the following categories Ck=1:M+1
where M denotes the number of prohibited items’

After segmenting the contours, we perform morphological post-processing to remove tiny and isolated frag-

22
23

1
The source code of the proposed framework along with
its complete documentation is available at https://github.
com/taimurhassan/tensorpooling.
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4.1.1 GDXray
GDXray [39] was first introduced in 2015 and it contains 19,407 high-resolution grayscale X-ray scans. The
dataset is primarily designed for the non-destructive
testing purposes and the scans within GDXray [39] are
arranged into five categories, i.e., welds, baggage, casting, settings and nature. But baggage is the only relevant group for this study and it contains 8,150 grayscale
X-ray scans. Moreover, the dataset also presents the
detailed annotations for the prohibited items such as
shuriken, knives, guns, and razors. As per the dataset
standard, 400 scans from GDXray [39] were used for
training purposes, while the remaining scans were used
for testing purposes.
4.1.2 SIXray

Fig. 5: (A) Shape Preserving Block (SPB), (B) Identity
Block (IB).

ments. The obtained outlines contain both open and
closed contours of the underlying suspicious items. The
closed contours can directly lead towards generating the
corresponding item’s mask. For open contours, we join
their endpoints and then derive their masks through
morphological reconstruction. Afterward, we generate
the items’ bounding boxes from the masks as shown in
Figure 2 (C).

4 Experimental Setup
This section presents the details about the experimental
protocols, datasets, and evaluation metrics which were
in order to assess the proposed system’s performance
and compare it with state-of-the-art methods.

4.1 Datasets
We validated the proposed framework on three different publicly available baggage X-ray datasets, namely,
GDXray [39], SIXray [13], and OPIXray [12]. The detailed description of these datasets are presented below.

SIXray [13] is a recently introduced large-scale security inspection X-ray dataset. It contains a total of
1,059,231 colored X-ray scans from which 8,929 scans
are positive (containing prohibited items such as knives,
wrenches, guns, pliers, hammer and scissors along
with their ground truths), and 1,050,302 are negative
(containing only the normal items). To validate the
performance against class imbalance, the authors of the
dataset presented three subset schemes of the dataset,
namely, SIXray10, SIXray100, and SIXray1000 [13].
Moreover, SIXray [13] is also the largest and most
challenging dataset (to date) designed to assess threat
detection frameworks’ performance towards screening
extremely cluttered and highly imbalanced contraband
data [13, 44]. As per the SIXray [13] dataset standard,
we used 80% scans for the training and the rest of 20%
for testing.
4.1.3 OPIXray
OPIXray [12] is the most recent baggage X-ray dataset
(released publicly for the research community in 2020).
It contains 8,885 colored X-ray scans. As per the
dataset standard, out of these 8,885 scans, 7,109 are
to be utilized for the training purposes, while the
remaining 1,776 are to be used for testing purposes, to
detect scissor, straight knife, multi-tool knife, folding
knife, and utility knife. Moreover, the dataset authors
also quantified occlusion within the test scans into
three levels, i.e., OP1, OP2, and OP3. OP1 indicates
that the contraband items within the candidate scan
contain no or slight occlusion, OP2 depicts a partial
occlusion, while OP3 represents severe or full occlusion
cases.
We also want to highlight here that the resolution of the
scans within each dataset varies significantly (except
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for OPIXray [12]). For example, on GDXray [39], the
scan resolution varies as 2688 × 2208, 900 × 1430, 850 ×
850 and 601 × 1241, etc. Similarly, on SIXray [13], the
scan resolution varies as 681 × 549 × 3, 801 × 482 × 3,
649 × 571 × 3, 1024 × 640 × 3, and 675 × 382 × 3, etc.
But on OPIXray [12], the resolution of all the scans
is 1225x954x3. In order to process all the scans with
the proposed framework, we have re-sized them to the
common resolution of 576×768×3, which is extensively
used in the recently published frameworks [42–44].

4.2 Training and Implementation Details
The proposed framework was developed using Python
3.7.4 with TensorFlow 2.2.0 and Keras APIs on a
machine havingIntel Core i9-10940X@3.30 GHz CPU,
128 GB RAM and an NVIDIA Quadro RTX 6000 with
cuDNN v7.5, and a CUDA Toolkit 10.1.243. Some
utility functions are also implemented using MATLAB
R2021a. Apart from this, the training on each dataset
was conducted for a maximum of 50 epochs using
ADADELTA [46] as an optimizer (with the default
learning and decay rate configurations) and a batch
size of 4. Moreover, 10% of the training samples from
each dataset were used for the validation (after each
epoch). For the loss function, we used the focal loss [10]
expressed below:
lf = −

bs −1 X
c−1
1 X
α(1 − p(li,j ))γ ti,j log(p(li,j ))
bs i=0 j=0

(2)

where c represents the total number of classes, and bs
denotes the batch size. p(li,j ) denotes the predicted
probability of the logit li,j generated from ith training sample for the j th class, ti,j tells if the ith training
sample actually belongs to the j th class or not, the term
α(1 − p(li,j ))γ represents the scaling factor that gives
more weight to the imbalanced classes (in other words,
it penalizes the network to give emphasize to the classes
for which the network obtain low prediction scores).
Through rigorous experiments, we empirically selected
the optimal value of α and γ as 0.25 and 2, respectively, as they result in faster learning for each dataset
while simultaneously showing good resistance to the
imbalanced data. Apart from this, architecturally, the
kernel sizes within the proposed encoder-decoder backbone vary as 3x3 and 7x7, whereas the number of kernels varies as 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, and 2048. Moreover, the pooling size within the network remained 2x2
across various network depths to perform the feature
decomposition (at each depth) by the factor of 2. For
more architectural and implementation details of the
proposed framework, we refer the reader to the source
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code, which we have released publicly for the research
community on GitHub1 .
4.3 Evaluation Metrics
In order to assess the proposed approach and compare
it with the existing works, we used the following evaluation metrics:
4.3.1 Intersection-over-Union
Intersection-over-Union (IoU) tells how accurately the
suspicious items have been extracted, and it is measured by checking the pixel-level overlap between the
predictions and the ground truths. Mathematically, IoU
is defined as:
Tp
IoU =
,
(3)
Tp + Fp + Fn
where Tp are true positives (indicating that the pixels of
the contraband items are correctly predicted w.r.t the
ground truth), Fp represents false positives (indicating
that the background pixels are incorrectly classified as
positives), and Fn represents false negatives (meaning
that the pixels of the contraband items are misclassified
as background). Furthermore, we also calculated the
mean IoU (µIoU) by taking an average of the IoU score
for each contraband item class.
4.3.2 Dice Coefficient
Apart from IoU scores, we also computed the dice coefficient (DC) scores to assess the proposed system’s
performance for extracting the contraband items. DC
is calculated through:
DC =

2Tp
,
2Tp + Fp + Fn

(4)

Compared to IoU, DC gives more weightage to the true
positives (as evident from Eq. 4). Moreover, the mean
DC (µDC) is calculated by averaging DC scores for each
category.
4.3.3 Mean Average Precision
The mean average precision (mAP) (in the proposed
study) is computed by taking the mean of average precision (AP) score calculated for each contraband item
class for the IoU threshold ≥ 0.5. Mathematically, mAP
is expressed below:

mAP =

nX
c −1
i=0

AP (i),

(5)

Taimur Hassan? et al.

8

5.1.1 Number of Orientations and the Scaling Levels

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(F)

Fig. 6: Detection performance of the proposed system
in terms of mAP (A, B, C), and computational time in
terms of seconds (D, E, F) obtained for GDXray [39],
SIXray [13], and OPIXray [12] datasets, respectively.

where nc denotes the number of contraband items in
each dataset. Here, we want to highlight that to achieve
fair comparison with the state-of-the-art, we have used
the original bounding box ground truths of each dataset
for measuring the proposed framework’s performance
towards extracting the suspicious and illegal items.

5 Results
In this section, we present the detailed results obtained
with GDXray [39], SIXray [13], and OPIXray [12]
datasets. Before going into the experimental results,
we present detailed ablation studies to determine
the proposed framework’s hyper-parameters. We also
report a detailed comparison of the proposed encoderdecoder network with the popular segmentation
models.

5.1 Ablation Studies
The ablation studies in this paper aim to determine the
optimal values for 1) the number of orientations and
scaling levels within the tensor pooling module and 2)
the choice of the backbone model for performing the
contour instance segmentation.

The tensor pooling module highlights the baggage content transitions in the image gradients oriented in N
directions and up to n scaling levels. Increasing these
parameters helps generate the best contour representation leading towards a more robust detection, but also
incurs additional computational cost. As depicted in
Figure 6 (A), we can see that for GDXray dataset [39]
with N = 2, n = 2, we obtain an mAP score of 0.82.
With the combination N = 5, n = 5, we get 16.54%
improvements in the detection performance but at the
expense of a 97.71% increase in computational time (see
Figure 6-D). Similarly, on the SIXray dataset [13], we
obtain 18.36% improvements in the detection performance (by increasing N and n) at the expense of 95.88%
in the computational time (see Figure 6 (B, E)). The
same behavior is also noticed for OPIXray dataset [12]
in Figure 6 (C, F). Considering all the combinations
depicted in Figure 6, we found that N = 4 and n = 3
provide the best trade-off between the detection and
run-time performance across all three datasets.
5.1.2 Choice of a Backbone Model
The proposed backbone model has been specifically designed to segment the suspicious items’ contours while
discarding the normal baggage content. In this series
of experiments, we compared the proposed asymmetric encoder-decoder model’s performance with popular
encoder-decoder, scene parsing, and fully convolutional
networks. In terms of µDC and µIoU, we report the
performance results in Table 1. We can observe that
the proposed framework achieves the best extraction
performance on OPIXray [12] and SIXray [13] dataset,
leading the second-best UNet [47] by 2.34% and 3.72%.
On the GDXray [39], however, it lags from the FCN-8
[48] and PSPNet [49] by 6.54% and 5.91%, respectively.
But as our model outperforms all the other architectures on the large-scale SIXray [13] and OPIXray [12]
datasets, we chose it as a backbone for the rest of the
experimentation.

5.2 Evaluation on GDXray Dataset
The performance of the proposed framework and of the
state-of-the-art methods on the GDXray [39] dataset
are reported in Table 2. We can observe here that the
proposed framework outperforms the CST [42] and the
TST framework [43] by 4.98% and 1.07%, respectively.
Furthermore, we wanted to highlight the fact that CST
[42] is only an object detection scheme, i.e., it can only
localize the detected items but cannot generate their
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Table 1: Performance comparison of the proposed backbone network with PSPNet [49], UNet [47] and FCN8 [48] for recognizing the boundaries of the contraband items. The best and second-best performances
are in bold and underline, respectively. Moreover, the
abbreviations are: Met: Metric, Data: Dataset, GDX:
GDXray [39], SIX: SIXray [13], OPI: OPIXray [12].
Met
µIoU

µDC

Data
GDX
SIX
OPI
GDX
SIX
OPI

Proposed
0.4994
0.7072
0.7393
0.6661
0.8285
0.8501

PSPNet
0.5585
0.5659
0.5645
0.7167
0.7227
0.7217

UNet
0.4921
0.6700
0.7159
0.6596
0.8024
0.8344

FCN-8
0.5648
0.6613
0.5543
0.7219
0.7961
0.7132

masks. Masks are very important for the human observers in cross-verifying the baggage screening results
(and identifying the false positives), especially from the
cluttered and challenging grayscale scans. In Figure 7,
we report some of the cluttered and challenging cases
showcasing the effectiveness of the proposed framework
in extracting the overlapping contraband items. For example, see the extraction of merged knife instances in
(H), and the cluttered shuriken in (J, L). We can also
appreciate how accurately the razors have been extracted in (J, L). Extracting such low contrast objects

Table 2: Performance comparison between state-of-theart baggage threat detection frameworks on GDXray
(GDX), SIXray (SIX), and OPIXray (OPI) dataset in
terms of mAP scores. ’-’ indicates that the respective
score is not computed. Moreover, the abbreviations are:
Data: Dataset, GDX: GDXray [39], SIX: SIXray [13],
OPI: OPIXray [12], PF: Proposed Framework, and FD:
FCOS [50] + DOAM [12].
Data
GDX

SIX

OPI

Items
Gun
Razor
Shuriken
Knife
mAP
Gun
Knife
Wrench
Scissor
Pliers
Hammer
mAP
Folding
Straight
Scissor
Multi
Utility
mAP

PF
0.9872
0.9691
0.9735
0.9820
0.9779
0.9863
0.9811
0.9882
0.9341
0.9619
0.9172
0.9614
0.8528
0.7649
0.8803
0.8941
0.8062
0.8396

CST
0.9101
0.8826
0.9917
0.9945
0.9281
0.9911
0.9347
0.9915
0.9938
0.9267
0.9189
0.9595
-

TST
0.9761
0.9453
0.9847
0.9632
0.9672
0.9734
0.9681
0.9421
0.9348
0.9573
0.9342
0.9516
0.8024
0.5613
0.8934
0.7802
0.7289
0.7532

FD
0.8671
0.6858
0.9023
0.8767
0.7884
0.8241

Fig. 7: Qualitative evaluations of the proposed framework on GDXray [39] dataset. Please zoom-in for best
visualization.

in the competitive CST framework requires suppressing
first all the sharp transitions in an iterative fashion [42].

5.3 Evaluations on SIXray Dataset
The proposed framework has been evaluated on the
whole SIXray dataset [13] (containing 1,050,302 negative scans and 8,929 positive scans) and also on each
of its subsets [13]. In Table 2, we can observe that the
proposed framework achieves an overall performance
gain of 0.190% and 0.980% over CST [42] and TST [43]
framework, respectively. In Table 3, we report the results obtained with each subset of the SIXray dataset
[13], reflecting different imbalanced normal and prohibited item categories. The results further confirm the
superiority of the proposed framework against other
state-of-the-art solutions, especially w.r.t the CHR [13],
and [15]. In addition to this, in an extremely challenging SIXray1000 subset, we notice that the proposed
framework leads the second-best TST framework [43]
by 3.22%, and CHR [13] by 44.36%.
Apart from this, Figure 8 depicts the qualitative evaluations of the proposed framework on the SIXray [13]
dataset. In this figure, the first row shows examples
containing one instance of the suspicious item, whereas
the second and third rows show scans containing two
or more instances of the suspicious items. Here, we
can appreciate how accurately the proposed scheme
has picked the cluttered knife in (B). Moreover, we
can also observe the extracted chopper (knife) in (D)
despite having similar contrast with the background.
More examples such as (F, H, and J) demonstrate the
proposed framework’s capacity in picking the cluttered
items from the SIXray dataset [13].
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Fig. 8: Qualitative evaluations of the proposed framework on SIXray [13] dataset. Please zoom-in for a best
visualization.
Table 3: Performance comparison of proposed framework with state-of-the-art solutions on SIXray subsets. For fair comparison, all models are evaluated
using ResNet-50 [35] as a backbone. Moreover, the
abbreviations are: SIX-10: SIXray10 [13], SIX-100:
SIXray100 [13], SIX-1k: SIXray1000 [13], and PF: Proposed Framework
Subset
SIX-10
SIX-100
SIX-1k

PF
0.9793
0.8951
0.8136

DTS
0.8053
0.6791
0.4527

CHR
0.7794
0.5787
0.3700

[15]
0.8600
-

TST
0.9601
0.8749
0.7814

5.4 Evaluations on OPIXray Dataset
The performance evaluation of the proposed framework
on OPIXray dataset [12] is reported in Table 2. We
can observe here that the proposed system achieves an
overall mAP score of 0.8396, outperforming the secondbest DOAM framework [12] (driven via FCOS [50]) by
1.55%. Here, although the performance of both frameworks is identical, we still achieve a significant lead of
7.91% over the DOAM [12] for extracting the straight
knives.
Concerning the level of occlusion (as aforementioned,
OPIXray [12] splits the test data into three subsets,
OP1, OP2, OP3, according to the level of occlusion),
we can see in Table 4 that the proposed framework
achieves the best performance at each occlusion level
as compared to the second-best DOAM [12] framework
driven by the single-shot detector (SSD) [51].
Figure 9 reports some qualitative evaluation, where we
can appreciate the recognition of the cluttered scissor
(e.g. see B and F), and overlapping straight knife (in
H). We can also notice the detection of the partially
occluded folding and straight knife in (D) and (J).

Fig. 9: Qualitative evaluations of the proposed framework on OPIXray [12] dataset. Please zoom-in for a
best visualization.

5.5 Failure Cases

In Figure 10, we report examples of failure cases encountered during the testing. In cases (B, H, N, and
P), we can see that the proposed framework could not
pick-up the whole regions of the contraband items, even
though the items were detected correctly. However, such
cases are observed in highly occluded scans such as (A
and G), where it is difficult, even for a human observer,
to distinguish the items’ regions properly. The second
type of failure corresponds to the pixels misclassification as shown in (D) where some of the gun’s pixels have
been misclassified as knife. We can address these scenarios through post-processing steps like blob removal and
region filling. The third failure case relates to the proposed framework’s inability to generate a single bounding box for the same item. Such a case is depicted in
(F), where two bounding boxes were generated for the
single orange knife item. One possible remedy here is to
generate the bounding boxes based upon the minimum
and maximum mask value in both image dimensions
for each label. Another type of failure is shown in (J)
and (L). Here, the scans contain only normal baggage
content, but some pixels occupying tiny regions have
been misclassified as false positive (i.e., knife). We can
also address this kind of failure through blob removal
scheme.
Examining the failure cases’ statistical distributions, we
found a majority of 86.09% cases belonging to the curable categories (i.e., second, third, and fourth), meaning that the proposed framework’s performance can be
further improved using the post-processing techniques
mentioned above.
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Table 4: Performance comparison of proposed framework with DOAM [12] (backboned through SSD [51])
on different occlusion levels of OPIXray [12] dataset.
Method
Proposed
DOAM + SSD [12]
SSD [51]

OP1
0.7946
0.7787
0.7545

OP2
0.7382
0.7245
0.6954

OP3
0.7291
0.7078
0.6630

6 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a novel contour-driven approach for detecting cluttered and occluded contraband
items (and their instances) within the baggage X-ray
scans, hypothesizing that contours are the most robust cues given the lack of texture in the X-ray imagery. We concretized this original approach through
a tensor pooling module, producing multi-scale tensor maps highlighting the items’ outlines within the
X-ray scans and an instance segmentation model acting on this representation. We validated our approach
on three publicly available datasets encompassing graylevel and colored scans and showcased its overall superiority over competitive frameworks in various aspects.
For instance, the proposed framework outperforms the
state-of-the-art methods [12, 42–44] by 1.07%, 0.190%,
and 1.55% on GDXray [39], SIXray [13], and OPIXray
[12] dataset, respectively. Furthermore, on each SIXray
subsets (i.e., SIXray10, SIXray100, SIXray1000) [13],
the proposed framework leads the state-of-the-art by
1.92%, 2.02%, and 3.22%, respectively.
In future, we aim to apply the proposed framework to
recognize 3D printed contraband items from the X-ray
scans. Such items exhibit poor visibility in the X-ray
scans because of their organic material, making them an
enticing and challenging case to investigate and address.
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